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Abstract
In this paper, intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) is proposed to enhance the physical layer security in
a Rician fading channel scenario where the angle direction of the eavesdropper is aligned with a legitimate
user. In this scenario, this paper considers a two-phase communication system under the active attacks and
passive eavesdropping. In particular, in the first phase, the BS avoids direct transmission to the attacked user.
While, in the second phase, other users cooperate to forward signals to the attacked user with the help of IRS
and energy harvesting technology. Under the active attacks, we investigate an outage constrained beamforming
design problem under the statistical cascaded channel error model, which is solved by using the Bernstein-type
inequality. As for the passive eavesdropping, an average secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated,
which is addressed by a low complexity algorithm. Numerical results show that the negative effect of the
eavesdropper’s channel error is greater than the legitimate user’s.
Index Terms
Intelligent reflecting surface (IRS), large intelligent surface (LIS), robust design, energy harvesting, physical
layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication security is widely regarded as one of the most challenging problems in wireless
communications. Traditionally, security is enforced by imposing cryptographic protocols in the appli-
cation layer [1]. However, this upper layer solution is not flexible as it requires complex key exchange
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2protocols. Fortunately, it is shown by Wyner [2] that secure communication can be guaranteed by
adopting some advanced signal processing techniques developed in the physical layer. In specific,
these techniques exploit differences in channel conditions and interference environment to enhance the
received signal of legitime users (LUs) and suppress the signal received by the eavesdropper (ED).
In order to enhance physical layer security, intelligent reflecting surface (IRS), a kind of passive
metasurface, has emerged as a promising technique [3]–[5], since each passive element on the IRS is
capable of reconfiguring the wireless channels between the base station (BS) and LU constructively
while suppressing the radio frequency (RF) power leaked to the ED by imposing an independent phase
shifts to the incident signal [6]–[10]. Furthermore, the IRS can be readily coated on existing buildings,
such as the walls and ceilings, which reduces the cost and complexity of deployment operations.
Hence, IRS holds great promise for excellent security enhancement as it provides a cost-effective and
energy-efficient approach.
In general, ED works in two modes: active attacks and passive eavesdropping [11], [12]. In an active
attack, in order to mislead the BS to send signals to the ED, the ED pretends to be a LU sending pilot
contamination to interfere with the channel estimation procedure at the BS. Nonetheless, a passive
attack is more difficult to deal with since the passive ED can hide itself and its CSI is not known at
the BS.
Recently, the benefits of IRS in physical layer security under the active attacks have been investigated
in the existing literature [6]–[10]. The performance gains of IRS in terms of security capacity was first
explored in a simple model consisting of only one single-antenna LU and one single-antenna ED in
[6]. Closed-form solutions of the phase shifters of IRS were obtained by leveraging the majorization-
minimization (MM) technique in [6], which had a better performance than the classical semidefinite
relaxation (SDR) method. The authors in [7] extended the results in [6] to a multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) system where artificial noise (AN) was introduced to enhance the security performance.
The results in [8] further showed that the IRS-aided design without AN performs even worse than the
AN-aided design without IRS as the number of eavesdroppers near the IRS increases. However, all
the above contributions were based on the assumption of perfect channel state information (CSI) of
the eavesdropping channels at the BS. This assumption is too strict and even impractical. The reasons
are twofold: 1) It is challenging to estimate the IRS-related channels since IRS is passive and can
neither send nor receive pilot symbols. 2) The pilot transmission from the ED to the BS may not be
continuous and the corresponding CSI at the BS may be outdated. To deal with the imperfect CSI
of the ED, robust transmission methods for IRS secure communication were proposed in [9], [10]. In
particular, the authors in [9] proposed a robust secure transmission strategy by applying the worst-case
3optimization method under the assumption of imperfect CSI from the IRS to the ED. On the other
hand, the authors in [10] considered the more practical imperfect cascaded BS-IRS-ED channel and
proposed an outage constrained beamforming design method under the statistical CSI error model.
However, the imperfect CSI of both LU and ED was not studied in [10].
To the best of our knowledge, all the existing contributions on the IRS-aided security enhancement
were developed under the active attack, where the BS can acquire the CSI of ED. There is no existing
work studying the passive eavesdropping in IRS-aided secure communication systems. In addition, even
for the imperfect CSI under the active attack, the methods proposed in [9], [10] are only applicable to
small-size IRS (the number of the reflection elements is less than 10), which can be observed from the
numerical simulations. The limitations for the research of small-size IRS lie in twofold. The first is
that IRS has advantages over the conventional massive MIMO and relay in terms of energy efficiency
only when the number of IRS reflection elements is large [24]. Second, some interesting observations
can be found in the robust design in IRS system only when the number of reflection elements is large
enough [14].
Against the above background, this paper studies the IRS-aided secrecy communication under the
active attacks and passive eavesdropping. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• This paper proposes an IRS-aided two-phase secrecy communication scheme for a scenario where
the ED has a similar channel direction as a LU in order to asquire high-quality eavesdropping
information. In particular, in the multicasting phase, the BS transmits signals to the LU with low
transmission power to reduce the information leakage to the ED. In the user cooperation phase,
other LUs forward the received signals to the attacked LU with the assistance of IRS by using
the energy harvested in the previous phase. In addition, two models of ED are considered in this
work, i.e. active attack and passive eavesdropping.
• In the presence of statistical CSI error under the active attack, we develop an outage con-
strainted beamforming design problem that maximizes the secrecy rate subject to the unit-modulus
constraint, the energy harvesting constraint and the secrecy rate outage probability constraint.
Here, the outage probability constraint guarantees the maximum secrecy rate of the system
for secure communication under a predetermined probability. By resorting to the Bernstein-
Type Inequality (BTI) and some convex approximations, the non-convexity of constraints is
addressed. Then, the active precoders and the passive reflection beamforming are updated by
using the proposed semidefinite programming (SDP) and penalty convex-concave procedure (CCP)
technique respectively in an iterative manner.
4• For the passive ED case with only partial CSI, we aim to maximize an average secrecy rate
subject to the unit-modulus of the reflection beamforming and the energy harvesting constraints.
To address the numerical integration in the objective function, an angular secrecy model, which
is analytically non-convex, is proposed. A low-complexity algorithm is proposed based on the
MM-based alternate optimization (AO) framework, where the precoders are updated by solving a
convex optimization problem and the reflection beamforming is updated in a closed-form solution
which is globally optimal.
• The numerical results demonstrate that the level of the cascaded CSI error plays a vital role in the
IRS-aided secure communication systems. Specifically, when the cascaded CSI error is small, the
secrecy rate increases with the size of the IRS due to the increased beamforming gain. However,
when the cascaded CSI error is large, the secrecy rate decreases with the size of the IRS due to the
increased channel estimation error. Hence, whether to deploy the IRS in secure communication
systems depends on the level of the cascaded CSI error. In addition, the IRS can enhance the
average secrecy rate under the passive eavesdropping.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the channel model and the
system model. Outage constrained robust design problem is formulated for the active eavesdropper
model in Section III. Section IV further investigates the average eavesdropping rate maximization
problem under the passive eavesdropping. Finally, Section V and Section VI show the numerical
results and conclusions, respectively.
Notations: The following mathematical notations and symbols are used throughout this paper. Vectors
and matrices are denoted by boldface lowercase letters and boldface uppercase letters, respectively. The
symbols X∗, XT, XH, and ||X||F denote the conjugate, transpose, Hermitian (conjugate transpose),
Frobenius norm of matrix X, respectively. The symbol ||x||2 denotes 2-norm of vector x. The symbols
Tr{·}, Re{·}, |·|, λ(·), and 6 (·) denote the trace, real part, modulus, eigenvalue, and angle of a complex
number, respectively. diag(x) is a diagonal matrix with the entries of x on its main diagonal. [x]m
means the mth element of the vector x. The Kronecker product and the Hadamard product between
two matrices X and Y is denoted by X⊗Y and XY, respectively. X  Ymeans that X−Y is
positive semidefinite. Additionally, the symbol C denotes complex field, R represents real field, and
j ,
√−1 is the imaginary unit.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider Rician wiretap channels where a BS with N transmit antennas
communicates with K single-antenna LUs in the presence of a single-antenna ED. An IRS with M
reflection elements is introduced to aid the secure communication.
A. Channel Model
Define the set of all LUs as K = {1, 2, ..., K}, and denote set K−K = K/{K} and set K+E =
K ∪ {E}. By denoting {Di, θi}∀i∈K+E as the distances and the azimuth angles from the BS to the
LUs and the ED, as shown in Fig. 1, then the corresponding channels {gi ∈ CN×1}∀i∈K+E obey the
following Rician fading distribution [13]:
gi =
√
%0
(
Di
d0
)−αBS(√ KBS
1 +KBS
gLOSi +
√
1
1 +KBS
gNLOSi
)
,∀i ∈ K+E, (1)
where %0 is the pathloss at the reference distance of d0, αBS and KBS are the pathloss exponent and
the Rician factor of the BS-related links, respectively. It is assumed that the BS is equipped with a
uniform linear array (ULA).
6Then, the line-of-sight (LoS) component is given by gLOSi =
[
1, e−jpi sin θi , · · · , e−j(N−1)pi sin θi], and
the non-LoS component is drawn from a Rayleigh fading, i.e., gNLOSi ∼ CN(0, IN).
Furthermore, by denoting {DIRS, θIRS} as the distance and the azimuth angle from the BS to the
IRS, it is straightforward to obtain the distances {dIRS,i}∀i∈K+E and the azimuth angles {ϕi}∀i∈K+E
from the IRS to the LUs and the ED as shown in Fig. 2, i.e.,
dIRS,i =
[
(DIRS cos θIRS −Di cos θi)2 + (DIRS sin θIRS −Di sin θi)2
]−1/2
,
sinϕi =
1
dIRS,i
(Di sin θi −DIRS sin θIRS),
cosϕi =
1
dIRS,i
(DIRS cos θIRS −Di cos θi).
The corresponding channels {hi ∈ CN×1}∀i∈K+E are given by
hi =
√
%0
(
dIRS,i
d0
)−αIRS(√ KIRS
1 +KIRS
hLOSi +
√
1
1 +KIRS
hNLOSi
)
,∀i ∈ K+E, (2)
where αIRS and KIRS are the pathloss exponent and the Rician factor of the IRS-related links, respec-
tively. The non-LoS component follows the distribution of hNLOSi ∼ CN(0, IM). It is assumed that the
IRS is an uniform plane array (UPA) with size of M = MxMy, where Mx and My are the number of
reflection elements in x-axis and y-axis, respectively. Then, the LoS component is written as
hLOSi =[1, · · · , e−jpi(x cosϕi cosφ+y sinϕi cosφ) sin θi , · · · , e−jpi((Mx−1) cosϕi cosφ+(My−1) sinϕi cosφ) sin θi ],
where 1 ≤ x ≤Mx, 1 ≤ y ≤My and φ is the elevation angle observed at the IRS side.
B. Signal Transmission
To achieve high attack success rate, the ED can locate on the line between the BS and legitimate
user. In this situation, the signal received by the ED is highly correlated with that of this user [11], [12],
thus posing great threats to the system. As shown in Fig. 1, we assume that the ED hides at the line
connecting the BS and one of the users, denoted as user K, which leads to θE ≈ θK , gLOSE ≈ gLOSK and
DE ∈ (0, DK). When the Rician factor KBS is sufficiently large, the channel gain gE is approximately
equal to the channel gain gK .
In order to achieve high-quality secure communication, the angle aware user cooperation (AAUC)
scheme [13] is adopted here. In particular, in the first phase, the BS multicasts the common signal
to all users except user K. In the second phase, the helping users (∀k ∈ K−K) forward the decoded
common signal to user K via the IRS. In this work, in order to implement the AAUC scheme without
consuming extra energy, the LUs adopt the hybrid information and energy harvesting receiving mode
7which splits the received signal into two power streams with power splitting ratios tk and 1− tk. The
former is used for decoding the signal and the latter for energy harvesting.
1) Multicasting Phase: In this phase, the BS multicasts a signal s to the helping LUs through
beamforming vector f ∈ CN×1 which is limited to the maximum transmit power Pmax, i.e., ||f ||22≤ Pmax.
Since gE ≈ gK , the beamforming f needs to satisfy |gHKf |= 0 to ensure that |gHEf |≈ 0. Let Q ∈
CN×(N−1) be the orthogonal matrix which spans the null space of gK by using the QR decomposition,
i.e., QHQ = I. Then, we can design f = Qz, where z ∈ C(N−1)×1 is a newly introduced variable.
Therefore, the signal received by LU k is given by gHk Qz + nk, where nk is the received noise with
the noise power of σ2k. By adopting the hybrid receiving mode, the achievable rate at LU k 6= K is
Rk (z, t) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
tk
σ2k
∣∣gHk Qz∣∣2) , (3)
where the factor 1/2 is due to the two transmission phases. The harvested power at LU k 6= K is
(1− tk)
∣∣gHk Qz∣∣2 . (4)
2) User Cooperation Phase: In this phase, the helping LUs (∀k ∈ K−K) forward the signal s to LU
K through a beamforming vector w ∈ C(K−1)×1 = [w1, ..., wK−1]T by using the power harvested in
the multicasting phase. Since LU K is randomly selected by the ED and assume that many obstacles
in the communication environment, such as indoor applications, the direct links between the helping
LUs and the LU K may be blocked. To address this issue, an IRS can be installed on the building with
a certain height, and thus the IRS is capable of reflecting the signals forwarded by the helping LUs
to LU K. Denote by e the reflection coefficient vector of the IRS, where |em|2= 1,∀m = 1, · · · ,M .
Then, the signal received by LU K is given by
yK = h
H
Kdiag(e
∗)HIRSws+ σ2K
= eHHKws+ σ
2
K ,
where HIRS = [h1, ..., hK−1], HK = [h∗K  h1, ..., h∗K  hK−1] is the cascaded LU-IRS-LU (LIL)
channel, and nK ∼ CN(0, σ2K) is the noise. The corresponding achievable rate is
RK (w, e) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2K
∣∣eHHKw∣∣2) . (5)
On the other hand, the signal recieved by the ED is yE = eHHEws+nE , where HE = [h∗E  h1, ..., h∗E  hK−1]
is the cascaded LU-IRS-ED (LIE) channel, and nE ∼ CN(0, σ2E) is the received noise at the ED.
The corresponding eavesdropping rate is
RE (w, e) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2E
∣∣eHHEw∣∣2) . (6)
8Finally, the secrecy rate of this system under the AAUC scheme can be expressed as [12]:[
min
∀k∈K
Rk −RE
]+
. (7)
In the following two sections, we consider the system design for two ED models: active eavesdropper
model and the passive eavesdropper model.
III. ED MODEL I-ACTIVE EAVESDROPPER MODEL
In this section, we consider the active attack case, in which the ED pretends to be an LU sending
pilot signals to interfere with the channel estimation procedure at the transmitters (including the BS
and the helping LUs) [11], [12]. It is reasonable to assume that the BS is capable of addressing this
attack by using the multi-antenna technique, so as to obtain perfect CSI of the system. Nevertheless,
the signle-antenna helping LUs only have the imperfect CSI of LU K and the ED due to their limited
anti-interference ability.
A. Channel Uncertainties
Based on the above assumption, the cascaded channels can be modeled as
HK = ĤK +4K , HE = ĤE +4E, (8)
where ĤK and ĤE are the estimated cascaded channels, and 4K = [4K1 · · ·4KK−1] and 4E =
[4E1 · · ·4EK−1] are the unknown cascaded channel errors. 4Kk and 4Ek are the unknown cascaded
LIL and LIE channel error vectors at LU k, respectively.
According to [14], the robust beamforming under the statistical CSI error model outperforms the
bounded CSI error model in terms of the minimum transmit power, convergence speed and complexity.
In addition, the statistical channel error model is more suitable to model the channel estimation error
when the channel estimation is based on the minimum mean sum error (MMSE) method. Hence, we
adopt the statistical model to characterize the cascaded CSI imperfection [14], i.e., each CSI error
vector is assumed to follow the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) distribution, i.e.,
4Kk ∼ CN(0,ΣKk ),ΣKk  0,∀k ∈ K−K , (9a)
4Ek ∼ CN(0,ΣEk ),ΣEk  0,∀k ∈ K−K , (9b)
where ΣKk ∈ CM×M and ΣEk ∈ CM×M are positive semidefinite error covariance matrices. Note that
the CSI error vectors of different LUs are independent with each other. Therefore, we have
vec(4K) ∼ CN(0,ΣK), vec(4E) ∼ CN(0,ΣE), (10)
where ΣK and ΣE are block diagonal matrices, i.e., ΣK = diag(ΣK1 , ...,Σ
K
K−1) and ΣE = diag(Σ
E
1 , ...,Σ
E
K−1).
9B. Outage constrained beamforming design
Under the statistical CSI error model, we develop a probabilistically robust algorithm for the secrecy
rate maximization problem, which is formulated as
max
Rsec,z,w,e,t
Rsec (11a)
s.t.Pr
{
min
∀k∈K
Rk −RE ≥ Rsec
}
≥ 1− ρ (11b)
||z||22≤ Pmax (11c)
|em|2= 1, 1 ≤ m ≤M (11d)
0 ≤ t ≤ 1 (11e)
|wk|2≤ (1− t)
∣∣gHk Qz∣∣2 , ∀k ∈ K−K , (11f)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1] is the secrecy rate outage probability.
Problem (11) is difficult to solve due to the computationally intractable rate outage probability
constraint (11b), the non-convex unit-modulus constraint (11d), and the non-convex power constraint
(11f).
Firstly, we replace constraint (11b) with the development of a safe approximation consisting of three
steps in the following.
Step 1: Decouple the Probabilistic Constraint: First of all, based on the independence between
{gk}∀k∈K−K and HK , we have
(11b)⇔
K∏
k=1
Pr {Rk −RE ≥ Rsec} ≥ 1− ρ (12)
⇐Pr {Rk −RE ≥ Rsec} ≥ 1− ρ¯, ∀k ∈ KK (13)
where ρ¯ = 1− (1− ρ)1/K .
Step 2: Convenient Approximations: To address the non-concavity of Rk −RE,∀k ∈ KK , we need
to construct a sequence of surrogate functions of {Ri}∀i∈K+E . More specifically, we need the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1 [15] The quadratic-over-linear function x2
y
is jointly convex in (x, y), and lower bounded
by its first-order Tayler approximation 2x
(n)
y(n)
x− (x(n)
y(n)
)2y at fixed point (x(n), y(n)).
10
By substituting x with gHk Qz and y with 1/t, we utilize Lemma 1 to obtain a concave lower bound
of rate Rk (z, t) for ∀k ∈ K−K . The lower bound is given by
R˜k(z, t|z(n),t(n)) = 1
2
log2
(
1− t
(n),2
k
σ2ktk
∣∣gHk Qz(n)∣∣2 + 2t(n)k Re{ 1σ2k z(n),HQHgkgHk Qz
})
(14)
for any feasible solution {z(n), t(n)}.
Lemma 2 The upper bound of rate RE (w, e) is given by
R˜E (w, e, aE) =
aE
∣∣eHHEw∣∣2 /σ2E + aE − ln aE − 1
2 ln 2
,
where aE is the auxiliary variable.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. 
Lemma 3 The lower bound of rate RK (w, e) is given by
R˜K(w, e,aK , v) =
1
2 ln 2
(−aK |v|2|eHHKw|2−σ2KaK |v|2+2aKRe
{
veHHKw
}− aK + ln aK + 1),
where aK and v are the auxiliary variables.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. 
For the convenience of derivations, we assume that ΣKk = ε
2
K,kIM and Σ
E
k = ε
2
E,kIM , then ΣK =
ΛK⊗ IM where ΛK = diag(ε2K,1, ..., ε2K,K−1), and ΣE = ΛE⊗ IM where ΛE = diag(ε2E,1, ..., ε2E,K−1).
Furthermore, the error vectors in (10) can be rewritten as vec(4K) = Σ
1
2
KiK where iK ∼ CN(0, IM(K−1)),
and vec(4E) = Σ
1
2
EiE where iE ∼ CN(0, IM(K−1)). Define E = eeH and W = wwH. Combining
(14) with Lemma 2, the secrecy rate outage probabilities for ∀k ∈ K−K in (13) are equivalent to
Pr {Rk −RE ≥ Rsec}
≥Pr
{
R˜k − R˜E ≥ Rsec
}
=Pr
{
aETr
(
E(ĤE +4E)W(ĤHE +4HE)
)
− [2 ln 2(R˜k −Rsec)− aE + ln aE + 1]σ2E ≤ 0
}
=Pr
{
iHEUEiE + 2Re
{
uHEiE
}
+ uk ≤ 0
}
, (15)
where
UE = aEΣ
1
2
E(W
T ⊗ E)Σ
1
2
E, (16a)
uE = aEΣ
1
2
Evec(EĤEW), (16b)
uk = aETr
(
EĤEWĤ
H
E
)
− [(R˜k −Rsec)2 ln 2− aE + ln aE + 1]σ2E. (16c)
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Combining Lemma 2 with Lemma 3, the secrecy rate outage probability for LU K in (13) is
equivalent to
Pr {RK −RE ≥ Rsec}
≥Pr
{
R˜K − R˜E ≥ Rsec
}
=Pr
{
aK |v|2Tr
(
E(ĤK +4K)W(ĤHK +4HK)
)
− 2aKRe
{
veH(ĤK +4K)w
}
+
aE
σ2E
Tr
(
E(ĤE +4E)W(ĤHE +4HE)
)
− c ≤ 0
}
=Pr
{
iHUKi + 2Re
{
uHKi
}
+ uK ≤ 0
}
, (17)
where
i = [ iHK , i
H
E
]H, (18a)
UK = diag
{
aK |v|2Σ
1
2
K(W
T ⊗ E)Σ
1
2
K ,
aE
σ2E
Σ
1
2
E(W
T ⊗ E)Σ
1
2
E
}
, (18b)
uK = [aK |v|2vecH(EĤKW)Σ
1
2
K − aKvvecH(ewH)Σ
1
2
K ,
aE
σ2E
vecH(EĤEW)Σ
1
2
E]
H, (18c)
uK = aK |v|2Tr
(
EĤKWĤ
H
K
)
+
aE
σ2E
Tr
(
EĤEWĤ
H
E
)
− 2aKRe
{
veHĤKw
}
− c, (18d)
c = ln aE + ln aK − aE − aK − 2Rsec ln 2− σ2KaK |v|2+2. (18e)
Now, substituting (15) and (17) into (13), then (13) is replaced by
Pr
{
iHEUEiE + 2Re
{
uHEiE
}
+ uk ≤ 0
} ≥ 1− ρ¯, ∀k ∈ K−K , (19a)
Pr
{
iHUKi + 2Re
{
uHKi
}
+ uK ≤ 0
} ≥ 1− ρ¯. (19b)
Step 3: A Bernstein-Type Inequality-Based Safe Approximation: The outage probabilities in (19)
are characterized by quadratic inequalities, which can be safely approximated by using the following
lemma.
Lemma 4 (Bernstein-Type Inequality) [16] Assume f(x) = xHUx+2Re{uHx}+u, where U ∈ Hn×n,
u ∈ Cn×1, u ∈ R and x ∈ Cn×1 ∼ CN(0, I). Then for any ρ ∈ [0, 1], the following approximation
12
holds:
Pr{xHUx + 2Re{uHx}+ u ≤ 0} ≥ 1− ρ
⇒Tr {U}+
√
2 ln(1/ρ)x− ln(ρ)λ+max(U) + u ≤ 0
⇒

Tr {U}+√2 ln(1/ρ)x− ln(ρ)y + u ≤ 0√||U||2F+2||u||22 ≤ x
yI−U  0, y ≥ 0,
(20)
where λ+max(U) = max(λmax(U), 0). x and y are slack variables. 
Before using Lemma 4, we need the following simplified derivations for LU k, ∀k ∈ K−K , i.e.,
Tr {UE} = Tr
{
aEΣ
1
2
E(W
T ⊗ E)Σ
1
2
E
}
= Tr
{
aE(W
T ⊗ E)(ΛE ⊗ IM)
}
= aEMTr {ΛEW} , (21a)
||UE||2F= a2EM2||ΛEW||2F , (21b)
||uE||22= a2EvecH(EĤEW)(ΛE ⊗ IM)vec(EĤEW)
= a2EM ||Λ
1
2
EWĤ
H
Ee||22, (21c)
λmax(UE) = λmax(aEΣ
1
2
E(W
T ⊗ E)Σ
1
2
E)
= λmax(aE(ΛEW
T ⊗ E))
= aEλmax(ΛEW)λ(E) = aEMw
HΛEw. (21d)
By substituting (21) into (20) and introducing slack variables {xE, yE}, the constraints for ∀k ∈ K−K
in (19a) are transformed into the following deterministic form:
BTI1 ,

Tr {UE}+
√
2 ln(1/ρ¯)xE − ln(ρ¯)yE
+uk ≤ 0,∀k ∈ K−K∥∥∥∥∥∥ aEMvec(ΛEW)√2MaEΛ 12EWĤHEe
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ xE
yE ≥ aEMwHΛEw.
(22)
13
On the other hand, the simplified derivations for LU K are given by
Tr {UK} = aK |v|2MTr {ΛKW}+ aE
σ2E
MTr {ΛEW} , (23a)
||UK ||2F= a2K |v|4M2||ΛKW||2F+
a2E
σ4E
M2||ΛEW||2F , (23b)
||uK ||2= M ||Λ
1
2
K
(
aK |v|2WĤHKe− aKvw
)
||22+
a2E
σ4E
M ||eHĤEWΛ
1
2
E||22, (23c)
λmax(UK) = max
{
aK |v|2MwHΛKw, aE
σ2E
MwHΛEw
}
.
By substituting the above equations into (20) and introducing slack variables {xK , yK}, the constraint
for LU K in (19b) is transformed into the following deterministic form:
BTI2 ,
Tr {UK}+
√
2 ln(1/ρ¯)xK − ln(ρ¯)yK + uK ≤ 0∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
aK |v|2Mvec(ΛKW)
aEMvec(ΛEW)/σ
2
E√
2MΛ
1
2
K
(
aK |v|2WĤHKe− aKvw
)
√
2MaEΛ
1
2
EWĤ
H
Ee/σ
2
E
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ xK
yK ≥ λmax(UK), yK ≥ 0.
(24)
Then, to handle the non-convex power constraint (11f), we replace the right hand side of (11f) with
its linear lower bound
Ξ(z, t) =2(1− t(n))Re{z(n),HQHgkgHk Qz}− (1− t(n))2 ∣∣gHk Qz(n)∣∣2(1− t) (25)
at feasible point {z(n), t(n)} by adopting the same first-order Taylor approximation used in Lemma 1.
Therefore, based on (22), (24) and (25) and denoting x = [xE, xK ]Tand y = [yE, yK ]T, the
approximation problem of Problem (11) is given by
max
Rsec,z,w,e,t,aK ,aE ,v,x,y
Rsec (26a)
s.t.(22), (24), (11c)− (11e), (26b)
|wk|2≤ Ξ(z, t),∀k ∈ K−K . (26c)
For given {e, aK , aE, v}, we introduce a new variable W = wwH with rank(W) = 1. However,
different from the general semidefinite programming (SDP), w and W, here, coexist in (18d) and
(23c). Therefore, the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique is not applicable here. In order to handle
this problem, we assume w and W are two different variables. If Tr {W} = λmax(W), then we have
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rank(W) = 1. If the obtained W is not rank-1, we will have Tr {W}−λmax(W) > 0. Therefore, we
constrain Tr {W} − λmax(W) less than a very small real number threshold ε to guarantee the rank-1
condition of W, yielding the surrogate constraint of rank-1 constraint as
Tr {W} − λmax(W) ≤ ε. (27a)
When rank(W) ≈ 1, the relationship between w and W is given by the following constraint:
− ε ≤ ||w||2−Tr {W} ≤ ε. (28a)
As for constraint (27a), since λmax(W) is a convex function of W [15], the left hand side of (27a)
is concave, which is the difference between a linear function and a convex function. Hence, we need to
construct a convex approximation of constraint (27a). To address this issue, we introduce the following
lemma.
Lemma 5 Denote by vmax the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of a matrix V,
we have
Tr
{
vmaxv
H
max(Z−V)
}
= vHmaxZvmax − vHmaxVvmax
= vHmaxZvmax − λmax(V)
≤ λmax(Z)− λmax(V)
for any Hermitian matrix Z. 
Let d(n)W be the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of the feasible point W
(n).
Then, by using Lemma 5, then the surrogate convex constraint of (27a) is given by
Tr {W} − λmax(W(n))− Tr
{
d
(n)
Wd
(n),H
W (W −W(n))
}
≤ ε. (29)
Now, we consider constraint (28a). By appying the first-order Tayler approximation to ||w||2, we
obtain the following convex approximation of the constraint in (28a) as
||w||2−Tr {W} ≤ ε, (30a)
2Re
{
w(n),Hw
}− ||w(n)||2−Tr {W} ≥ −ε. (30b)
Finally, the subproblem w.r.t., {z,w,W, t} is formulated as
max
Rsec,z,w,W,t,x,y
Rsec (31a)
s.t.(22), (24), (11c), (11e), (31b)
(26c), (29), (30) (31c)
W  0. (31d)
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Problem (31) is an SDP and can be solved by the CVX tool.
For given {w, aK , aE, v}, Problem (26) with optimization variable e can be solved by applying the
penalty CCP [14], [17], [18] which is capable of finding a feasible solution that meets the unit-modulus
constraint (11d). In particular, the constraint in (11d) can be equivalently replaced by
|e[t]m|2−2Re(eHme[t]m) ≤ bm − 1, 1 ≤ m ≤M, (32a)
|em|2≤ 1 + bM+m, 1 ≤ m ≤M, (32b)
where e[t]m is any feasible solution and b = [b1, ..., b2M ]T is slack vector variable. The proof of (32)
can be found in [14], [17]. Following the penalty CCP framework, the subproblem for optimizing e
is formulated as
max
Rsec,e,x,y
Rsec − λ[t]||b||1 (33a)
s.t.(22), (24), (32). (33b)
Problem (33) is an SDP and can be solved by the CVX tool. The algorithm for finding a feasible
solution of e is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Penalty CCP optimization for reflection beamforming optimization
Initialize: Initialize e[0], γ[0] > 1, and set t = 0.
1: repeat
2: if t < Tmax then
3: Update e[t+1] by solving Problem (33);
4: λ[t+1] = min{γλ[t], λmax}; t = t+ 1;
5: else
6: Initialize with a new random e[0], set up γ[0] > 1 again, and set t = 0.
7: end if
8: until ||b||1≤ χ and ||e[t] − e[t−1]||1≤ ν.
9: Output e(n+1) = e[t].
In addition, Problem (26) is convex in {Rsec, v, x, y} for given {z,w, e, t, aK , aE, }, and convex
in {Rsec, aK , aE, x, y} for given {z,w, e, t, v, }. Finally, Problem (26) is addressed under the alternate
optimization (AO) framework containing four subproblems. The convergence of the AO framework can
be guaranteed due to the fact that each subproblem can obtain a non-decreasing sequence of objective
function values.
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IV. ED MODEL II-PASSIVE EAVESDROPPER MODEL
In this section, we focus on the transmission design for the passive attack, which is more practical
and more difficult to deal with, since the passive eavesdropper can hide itself and its CSI is not known
[11], [12]. The authors in [13] proposed to exploit the angular information of the ED to combat its
passive attack, which is also applicable here. In this section, the cascaded LIL channel HK and the
channel HIRS are assumed to be perfect, which is reasonable due to the fact that the pilot information
for channel estimation for LUs is known at the BS.
A. Average eavesdropping rate Maximization
The signal received by the ED is formulated as
yE = h
H
Ediag(e
∗)HIRSws+ σ2E.
Since the ED is passive, we can only detect the activity of the ED on the line segment between
the BS and LU K without knowing its exact location. This detection of a passive attack is based on
spectrum sensing [19]. Hence, the average eavesdropping rate is considered which can be computed
as follows [13], [20], [21]:
RavE (w, e) =
1
DK
∫ DK
0
E{hE}
[
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2E
∣∣hHEdiag(e∗)HIRSw∣∣2)
]
dDE . (34)
With (34), we formulate the following optimization problem:
max
z,w,e,t
{
min
∀k∈K
Rk −RavE (w, e)
}
(35a)
s.t.(11c)− (11f). (35b)
The main challenge to solve Problem (35) is from the average eavesdropping rate containing the
integration over DE and the expectation over hE . To address this issue, we use Jensen’s inequality to
construct an upper bound of RavE (w, e) given by
RupE (w, e)
=
1
2
log2
1 + ∫ DK0 E{hE}
[∣∣hHEdiag(e∗)HIRSw∣∣2] dDE
σ2EDK

=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2E
wHHHIRSdiag(e)REdiag(e
∗)HIRSw
)
, (36)
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where RE = 1DK
∫ DK
0
E{hE}[hEhHE]dDE which can be computed via one-dimension integration.
hi =
√
%0
(
dIRS,i
d0
)−αIRS(√ KIRS
1 +KIRS
hLOSi +
√
1
1 +KIRS
hNLOSi
)
,∀i ∈ K+E, (37)
According to (2), we define
hE =
√
%0
(
d,i
d0
)−αIRS KIRS
1 +KIRS
hLOSE , (38a)
RE = %0
(
dIRS,i
d0
)−αIRS 1
1 +KIRS
hNLOSE , (38b)
where hE describes the LoS component and RE is a positive semi-definite covariance matrix rep-
resenting the spatial correlation characteristics of the NLoS component. Therefore, we have hE ∼
CN(hE,RE) [22], and further get
E{hE}[hEh
H
E] =
[
RE + hE ∗ hHE
]
= %0
(
DE
d0
)−α [
1
1 +KR
IM +
KR
1 +KR
hLOSE (h
LOS
E )
H
]
.
B. Proposed Algorithm
By replacing RavE (w, e) with R
up
E (w, e) in the objective function of Problem (35), we have
max
z,w,e,t
{
min
∀k∈K
Rk −RupE
}
(39a)
s.t.(11c)− (11f). (39b)
Problem (39) is still difficult to solve due to the non-convex constraints and objective function, as
well as the coupled variables w and e. Hence, we propose a majorization–minimization (MM)-based
AO method to update w and e in an iterative manner. More specifically, by first fixing e, the non-
concave objective function w.r.t., {z,w, t} is replaced by its customized concave surrogate function
and then solved by the CVX. {z,w, t} are then fixed and the closed-form solution of e can be found
by constructing an easy-to-solve surrogate objective function w.r.t e.
The surrogate functions of Rk (z, t) for ∀k ∈ K−K are given by R̂k
(
z, t|z(n), t(n)) = R˜k (z, t|z(n), t(n))
given in (14), and those of RK (w, e) and RE (w, e) are given in the following lemma by using the
first-order Taylor approximation.
Lemma 6 Let {w(n), e(n)} be any feasible solution, then RK (w, e) is lower bounded by a concave
surrogate function R̂K
(
w, e|w(n), e(n)) defined by
R̂K(w, e|w(n), e(n)) = 1
2
log2
(
1− q
(n)
K
σ2K
+ 2Re
{
qK
σ2K
})
, (40)
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where q(n)K =
∣∣e(n),HHKw(n)∣∣2 and qK = e(n),HHKw(n)wHHHKe.
Meanwhile, RE (w, e) is upper bounded by a convex surrogate function R̂E
(
w, e|w(n), e(n)) given
by
R̂upE
(
w, e|w(n), e(n)) = 1
2
log2
(
1 +
q
(n)
E
σ2E
)
+
qE − q(n)E
2(σ2E + q
(n)
E ) ln 2
, (41)
where q(n)E = w
(n),HHHIRSdiag(e
(n))REdiag(e
(n),∗)HIRSw(n) and qE = wHHHIRSdiag(e)REdiag(e
∗)HIRSw.
Giving e and combining (14), (40), (41) and (26c), the subproblem of optimizing {z,w, t} is
formulated as
max
z,w,t
{
min
∀k∈K
R̂k − R̂upE
}
(42a)
s.t.(11c), (11e), (26c). (42b)
Introducing auxiliary variable r, we can transform Problem (42) into
max
z,w,t,r
{
r − R̂upE
}
(43a)
s.t.(11c), (11e), (26c) (43b)
R̂k ≥ r,∀k ∈ K, (43c)
which is convex and can be solved by using CVX.
Giving {z,w, t} and combining (14), (40) and (41), the subproblem w.r.t., e is formulated as
max
e
{
min
∀k∈K
R̂k − R̂upE
}
, s.t.(11d). (44)
Problem (44) can be addressed by transforming it into an SOCP under the penalty CCP method
mentioned in Section III-B. However, the penalty CCP method needs to solve a series of SOCP
problems which incurs a high computational complexity. In the following, we aim to derive a low-
complexity algorithm containing the closed-form solution of e.
Denote by R = minK−1k=1 {Rk (z, t)} that is a the constant, then the subproblem of Problem (39)
corresponding to the optimization of e is given by
max
e
{min{R, RK (e)} −RupE (e)} , s.t.(11d). (45)
Before solving Problem (45), we first consider the following two subproblems:
P1 : min
e
RupE (e) , s.t.(11d), RK (e) ≥ R. (46)
P2 : max
e
RK (e)−RupE (e) , s.t.(11d), RK (e) ≤ R. (47)
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where e#1 and e
#
2 are the optimal solutions of P1 and P2, respectively, giving in Lemma 7.
Let us denote the objective function value of Problem (45) as obj(e), which is a function of e. If
obj(e#1 ) ≥ obj(e#2 ), then the optimal solution of Problem (45) is given by e#1 . Otherwise, the optimal
solution is e#2 .
The solutions to Problem P1 and Problem P2 are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 The optimal solution of P1 is given by
e#1 = exp{j arg((λmax(AE)I−AE + %opt1 AK)e(n))}, (48)
where AE = (HIRSwwHHHIRS) (RTE/σ2E), AK = HKwwHHHK/σ2K and %opt1 is the price introduced
by the price mechanism [23].
The optimal solution of P2 is given by
e#2 = exp{j arg(c + %opt2 (λmax(AK)I−AK)e(n))}, (49)
where %opt2 is the price and
c =
1 + d
(n)
K
(1 + d
(n)
E )
2
(λmax(AE)I−AE)e(n) + AKe
(n)
1 + d
(n)
E
,
d
(n)
K = e
(n),HAKe
(n), d
(n)
E = e
(n),HAEe
(n).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. 
Since e#1 and e
#
2 are the global optimal solutions of P1 and P2, respectively, hence e
# is the global
optimal solution of Problem (45). The optimal price parameter can be obtained by using the bisection
search method detailed in [23].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes.
The simulated system setup is measured with polar coordinates: The BS is located at (0 m, 0) and
the IRS is placed at (50 m, 0) with elevation angle φ = 2pi
3
; K LUs are randomly and uniformly
distributed in an area with Dk ∼ U(20 m, 40 m) and θk ∼ U(−pi2 , pi2 ) for ∀k ∈ K, where U is
the uniform distribution. The ED is located at (DE, θK) with DE ∈ (0, DK). The pathloss at the
distance of 1 m is -30 dB, the pathloss exponents are set to αBS = αIRS = 2.2 and the Rician
factor is 5. The transmit power budget at the BS is Pmax = 30 dBm and the noise powers are
{σ2i = −100 dBm}∀i∈K+E . For the statistical CSI error model, the variances of {4Ki ,4Ei }∀i∈K−K are
defined as {ε2K,i = δ2K ||h∗K  hi||22, ε2E,i = δ2E||h∗E  hi||22}∀i∈K−K , where δK ∈ [0, 1) and δE ∈ [0, 1)
measure the relative amount of CSI uncertainties. In addition, the secrecy rate outage probability is
ρ = 0.05.
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A. Robust secrecy rate in ED Model I
In order to verify the performance of the proposed outage constrained beamforming in the AAUC,
the case of N = 8 and K = 5 is simulated. For comparison, we also consider the “Non-robust” scheme
as the benchmark scheme, in which the estimated cascaded LIL and LIE channels are naively regarded
as perfect channels, resulting in the following problem
max
z,w,e,t
{
min
∀k∈K
Rk −RE
}
(51a)
s.t.(11c)− (11f), (51b)
where RK (e) = 12 log2(1 +
∣∣∣eHĤKw∣∣∣2 /σ2K) and RE (e) = 12 log2(1 + ∣∣∣eHĤEw∣∣∣2 /σ2E). Problem (51)
can be solved by using the proposed low complexity algorithm used to solve Problem (35).
Fig. 3 investigates the feasibility rate and the maximum secrecy rate versus the distance of the ED,
in which the coordinate value of X-axis is ratio of DE/DK . The feasibility rate is defined as the ratio
of the number of channel realizations that have a feasible solution to the outage constrained problem
in (11) to the total number of channel realizations. It is observed from Fig. 3(a) that the closer the ED
is to LU K, the lower the feasibility rate, which means that the location of the eavesdropper imposes
a great threat to the security system. From Fig. 3(b), we can see that the secrecy rate drops fast when
the ED approaches LU K, and this secrecy rate reduces to zero when the channel error is large. At
this situation, the whole system is no longer suitable for secure communication.
Next, the performance versus the size of the IRS, i.e., M , is verified in Fig. 4. Assume that the ED
is located at DE/DK = 0.5. In Fig. 4(a), the feasibility rate decreases rapidly with M when the level
of channel uncertainty is high, which provides the guidance to choose the size of IRS according to
the level of channel uncertainty.
In Fig. 4(b), the case of δK = δE = 0 is regarded as the perfect cascaded CSI case, and its maximum
secrecy rate increases with M , which is consistent with that of Fig. 6 in [24]. The performance of
δK = δE = 0 can be used as the performance upper bound of the proposed outage constrained
beamforming method.
The maximum secrecy rate under small channel uncertainty levels, e.g., (δK = {0.1, 0.2}, δE = 0)
or (δK = 0, δE = 0.1), also increase with M . In addition, it is observed that black lines of δE = 0 are
higher than blue lines of δK = 0, which means that the negative impact of cascaded LIL channel error
on secrecy rate is smaller than that of the cascaded LIE channel error. Furthermore, when δE increases
to 0.1 or larger, secrecy rate starts to decrease at large M . The reason is that increasing M can not
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Fig. 3: Performance versus DE/DK under N = 8, M = 32 and K = 5.
only enhance the secrecy rate due to its increased beamforming gain, but also increase the cascaded
channel estimation error.
Therefore, when the channel uncertainty level, especially that of the ED, is small, the benefits
brought by the increase of M , outweighs its drawbacks, and vice versa. As a result, the number of
IRS reflection elements should be carefully chosen according to the level of the channel uncertainty.
B. Average secrecy rate in ED Model II
This subsection evaluates the performance of the proposed scheme under the passive attack. In
order to compare with the proposed low complexity algorithm, we consider two benchmark algorithms
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Fig. 4: Performance versus M under N = 8 and K = 5.
which are listed as: 1) The “SOCP” based scheme, i.e., the CVX is used to solve the SOCP version
of Problem (44). 2) The “Random” phase scheme, in which the phases of the reflection elements are
randomly generated.
Under the case of N = 8 and K = 5, the average secrecy rate versus M is shown in Fig. 5(a). It
can be seen that the performance of the proposed algorithm is almost the same as that of the SOCP
algorithm, and both of them outperform the scheme with random phases. Moreover, increasing the
size of the IRS can significantly increase the average secrecy rate of the system. Accordingly, Fig.
5(b) describes the CPU time required for these three algorithms. The simulation setup is the same
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Fig. 5: Performance versus M under N = 8 and K = 5.
as that of Fig. 5(a). The results are obtained by using a computer with a 1.99 GHz i7-8550U CPU
and 16 GB RAM. It is observed from Fig. 5(b) that the proposed algorthm with closed-form solution
requires much less CPU running time than the SOCP scheme. In addition, the CPU running time of
the SCOP-based algorithm increases significantly with the size of the IRS, but the proposed algorithm
is not sensitive to the size of the IRS. This is because the computational complexity of the SOCP
depends on M , while that of the closed-form solution does not.
Finally, Fig. 6 illustrates the performance and the complexity versus the number of users in the case
of M = 64. Again, the proposed algorithm can achieve the same performance of the SOCP-based
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Fig. 6: Performance versus K under M = 64.
scheme with less CPU running time. However, the average secrecy rate is saturated when the number
of users is greater than 7.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have proposed a two-phase IRS-aided communication system to realize the secure
communication under the active attacks and passive eavesdropping. In order to address the cascaded
channel error caused by the active attacks, we maximize the secrecy rate subject to secrecy rate outage
probability constraints, which has been tackled by using the Bernstein-Type Inequality. For the case
of the partial CSI of the ED, average secrecy rate maximization problem was considered, which is
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addressed by the proposed low-complexity algorithm. It was shown that the negative effect of the
ED’s channel error is greater than the LU’s. In addition, the number of elements on the IRS has a
negative impact on system performance when the channel error is large. This conclusion provides an
engineering insight for the careful selection of the size of the IRS.
APPENDIX A
THE PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To begin, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Let x ≥ 0 be a positive real number, and consider the function g1(a, x) = −ax+ ln a+ 1,
then
lnx−1 = max
a≥0
g1(a, x).
By appying Lemma 8, we can construct an upper bound of rate RE (w, e) as
RE (w, e) =
− ln(1 + ∣∣eHHEw∣∣2 /σ2E)−1
2 ln 2
(a)
=
−maxaE≥0 g1(aE, 1 +
∣∣eHHEw∣∣2 /σ2E)
2 ln 2
=
minaE≥0−g1(aE, 1 +
∣∣eHHEw∣∣2 /σ2E)
2 ln 2
≤ −g1(aE, 1 +
∣∣eHHEw∣∣2 /σ2E)
2 ln 2
,
for any aE ≥ 0
=
aE
∣∣eHHEw∣∣2 /σ2E + aE − ln aE − 1
2 ln 2
= R˜E (w, e, aE) , (52)
where the equality (a) is from Lemma 8.
Hence, the proof is complete.
APPENDIX B
THE PROOF OF LEMMA 3
To prove Lemma 3, we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Let v be a complex number, and consider the function g2(v, x) = (|x|2+σ2)|v|2−2Re {vx}+
1, then
σ2
|x|2+σ2 = minv g2(a, x).
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By appying Lemma 9, we can construct a lower bound of rate RK (w, e) as
RK (w, e) =
ln
(
1− |e
HHKw|2
σ2K+|eHHKw|2
)−1
2 ln 2
(a)
=
maxaK≥0 g(aK , 1− |
eHHKw|2
σ2K+|eHHKw|2
)
2 ln 2
≥
g(aK , 1− |e
HHKw|2
σ2K+|eHHKw|2
)
2 ln 2
,
for any aK ≥ 0
=
−aK
(
σ2K
σ2K+|eHHKw|2
)
+ ln aK + 1
2 ln 2
(b)
=
−aK
(
minv g2(v, e
HHKw)
)
+ ln aK + 1
2 ln 2
=
aK
(
maxv−g2(v, eHHKw)
)
+ ln aK + 1
2 ln 2
≥ aK
(−g2(v, eHHKw))+ ln aK + 1
2 ln 2
,
for any v ≥ 0
=
1
2 ln 2
(−aK |v|2|eHHKw|2−σ2KaK |v|2
+ 2aKRe
{
veHHKw
}− aK + ln aK + 1)
= R˜K (w, e, aK , v) (53)
where Equality (a) is from Lemma 8, and Equality (b) is from Lemma 9.
Hence, the proof is complete.
APPENDIX C
THE PROOF OF LEMMA 7
To begin with, we solve P1: P1 is equivalent to
min
e
eHAEe (54a)
s.t.(11d), (54b)
eHAKe ≥ e2R − 1 (54c)
where AE = (HIRSwwHHHIRS) (RTE/σ2E).
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Step 1: Construct a surrogate problem: Under the MM algorithm framework, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 10 [25], [26] Given A  A0 and x, then quadratic function xHA0x is majorized by xHAx−
2Re{x(n),H(A−A0)x}+ x(n),H(A−A0)x(n) at x(n).
By adopting Lemma 10 and setting A = λmax(AE)I for simplicity, the quadratic objective function in
(54a) is majorized by
2λmax(AE)M − 2Re{e(n),H(λmax(AE)I−AE)e} − e(n),HAEe(n) (55)
at e(n). To deal with the non-convex constraint (54c), we replace eHAKe with its linear lower bound,
resulting in the following equivalent constraint
(54c)⇒ 2Re{e(n),HAKe} ≥ e2R − 1 + e(n),HAKe(n). (56)
Step 2: Closed-form solution :
By omitting the constant, Problem (54) then becomes
max
e
2Re{e(n),H(λmax(AE)I−AE)e}, s.t.(11d), (56). (57)
According to [23], we introducing a price mechanism for solving Problem (57), i.e.,
max
e
2Re{e(n),H(λmax(AE)I−AE)e}
+ %12Re{e(n),HAKe}
s.t. (11d).
where %1 is a nonnegative price. Then, the globally optimal solution is given by
e#1 (%
opt
1 ) = exp{j arg((λmax(AE)I−AE + %1AK)e(n))}.
The optimal %opt1 is determined by using the bisection search method, the detailed information about
which can be found in [23].
Then, we solve P2: P2 is equivalent to
max
e
1 + eHAKe
1 + eHAEe
, (58a)
s.t.(11d), (58b)
eHAKe ≤ e2R − 1. (58c)
28
Step 1: Construct a surrogate problem: Under the MM algorithm framework, we construct a linear
lower bound of the objective funcion in (58a) as
1 + eHAKe
1 + eHAEe
(a)
≥ 2Re{1 + dK}
1 + d
(n)
E
− 1 + d
(n)
K
(1 + d
(n)
E )
2
(
1 + eHAEe
)
(b)
≥ 2Re{1 + dK}
1 + d
(n)
E
− 1 + d
(n)
K
(1 + d
(n)
E )
2
− 1 + d
(n)
K
(1 + d
(n)
E )
2
(2λmax(AE)M
− 2Re{e(n),H(λmax(AE)I−AE)e} − d(n)E )
= 2Re{cHe}+ const,
where dK = e(n),HAKe. {d(n)K , d(n)E , c} are defined in Lemma 7. Inequality (a) is due to Lemma 1,
and inequality (b) is from Lemma 10. By using Lemma 10 again, the convex constraint (58c) can be
replaced by an easy-to-solve form
(58c)⇒2Re{e(n),H(λmax(AK)I−AK)e} ≥ −2λmax(AK)M − e2R + 1− e(n),HAKe(n). (59)
Step 2: Closed-form solution : By omitting the constant, Problem (58) is then equivalent to
max
e
2Re{cHe}, s.t.(11d), (59). (60)
By using the price mechanism, Problem (58) is reformulated as
max
e
2Re{cHe}+ %22Re{e(n),H(λmax(AK)I−AK)e}
s.t.(11d).
where %2 is a nonnegative price. The globally optimal solution is given by e
#
2 (%
opt
2 ) = exp{j arg(c +
%2(λmax(AK)I−AK)e(n))} where the optimal %opt2 is determined by using the bisection search method.
Hence, the proof is complete.
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